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The System of Innovation (SI) framework is part of the tradition of innovation stud-
ies (Martin, 2012) that introduces an integrated 
and dynamic multidimensional perspective of the 
transformation of systems. The emergence of the 
so-called knowledge-based economies (Cooke, 
2001) has favored the introduction of these new 
analytical frameworks. A starting point for this 
kind of research is the recognition and understand-
ing of the complex processes that underlie the char-
acteristic innovation processes of  knowledge-based 
economies. These include knowledge-creation, 
diffusion and organization processes.
It is apparent that different patterns of inno-
vation exist across nations, regions, sectors and 
technologies. Thus, this is the reason why some 
authors consider the relevant level of analysis 
for innovation processes to be the national level 
(NSI) (Freeman, 1987, 2002; Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993), rather than the sectoral (SSI) 
(Malerba, 2002, 2004) or the regional level (RSI) 
(Cooke, Urange, & Etxebarria, 1997). More 
recently, Bergek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, Lindmark, 
and Rickne (2008) proposed technological inno-
vation systems (TIS) as a valid level of analysis. 
In any case, comparisons between actors, sources 
of novelty, institutions, and innovation policies 
in different nations (Bartels, Voss, Lederer, & 
Bachtrog, 2012), sectors or technologies show sig-
nificant disparities; suggesting that the sources of 
novelties and their role of dynamic  transformation 
across the economy is much more diverse and 
therefore requires a specific explanation (Mowery 
& Nelson, 1999).
The SI approach benefits from two conver-
gent traditions: firstly, the emphasis of a systemic 
approach to innovation processes; and secondly, 
the adoption of an evolutionary theoretical 
approach.1 In general a system of innovation 
comprises a set of agents that interactively deploy 
a set of market and extra-market activities (Larsen 
& von Tunzelmann, 2006) with the purpose of 
creating, producing and selling new products and 
services. The firms that operate within a system 
of innovation share certain common character-
istics and, at the same time, are heterogeneous. 
Thus, an SI is composed of a knowledge base, 
technologies, inputs and a potential (or existing) 
demand that characterize it. Furthermore, there is 
a set of institutions that circumscribe the environ-
ment within the agents of the system and interact. 
Agents interact through processes of communica-
tion, change, cooperation, competency and com-
mand in markets, but also through extra-market 
relationships. Finally, the SI approach to institu-
tions allows the establishment of relationships 
that emerge from interaction to be analyzed. 
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1 An interesting example of this is provided by Dodgson, 
Hughes, Foster, and Metcalfe (2011).
        
changing actual behaviors of the agents within a 
system; moreover, as action takes place in order to 
achieve the pursued goals, plans may be altered – 
modified, updated, removed. For example, Consoli 
and Ramlogan (2008) show that innovation sys-
tems are formed around self-transforming problem 
sequences posed by agents; firms are characterized 
by beliefs, expectations, competencies and organi-
zational forms and they deploy learning and knowl-
edge accumulation processes (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997). In fact SIs may be considered a con-
sequence (emerged or spontaneously generated) of 
the intentional action deployed by the agents (indi-
viduals and organizations) that interact within that 
system. To support this claim we will show how 
the interactive process – that is triggered by the 
deployment of agents’ actions in real time with the 
intention of achieving their own goals (Sarewitz & 
Nelson, 2008) – may be approached.
We depart from an abstract definition that a sys-
tem is a set of constitutive elements (objects such 
as knowledge, agents, institutions, beliefs, goals, 
etc.) and the connections between them serving 
a common purpose. This structure and its evolu-
tion should support the analytical description of 
dynamic phenomena such as innovation processes. 
We are interested in how and why an economic sys-
tem evolves, what the causes of such an evolution 
are and, lastly, in the differences across systems.
The main thesis is that agent intentionality is a 
necessary condition for a substantive explanation 
of the dynamism of economic systems. The argu-
ment is consistent with the role that the categories 
of intentionality, such as belief, goals, intention, 
collective intentionality, etc., are part of cognitive 
sciences, artificial intelligence and social philoso-
phy, etc. in the explanation of individual and col-
lective behavior and the emergence of institutions 
(Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Grosz & Hunsberger, 
2006; Metzinger & Gallese, 2003). In this sense, 
the paper should contribute to the microfoun-
dation of SI on agent action (or agency), which 
results in individual and organizational evolving 
capabilities, and their consequences for economic 
change (Felin & Foss, 2006, 2009; Loasby, 2006).
The paper is organized as follows: Systems, 
Knowledge and Connections section highlights 
From this perspective, it is possible to show how 
the same ‘common’ institutions (for example the 
patent system) can have so many different effects 
on innovation across sectors or countries (Nelson, 
2008b; Werger, 2003).
The usefulness of the SI framework lies in the 
fact that it allows innovation processes to be ana-
lyzed at two analytical levels. Firstly, due to the 
fact it is a conceptual framework that provides a 
multidimensional insight into the dynamic links 
that are characteristic of innovation processes. 
Evidence of this is the emphasis on the impor-
tance of analyzing the co-evolutionary processes 
that underlie and configure innovation processes. 
And secondly, because of the fact that the SI 
framework allows for the location of the role that 
knowledge and learning play in innovation pro-
cesses. However, these kinds of approaches are not 
free from criticism; one such criticism classes the 
innovation systems approach as, at best, heuristic 
rather than theoretical (Edquist, 2005, p. 186), it 
is over-theorized (Sharif, 2006, p. 757), or needs 
a change in its theoretical foundations (Lundvall, 
2007, p. 97).
We find that SIs differ substantially because 
there are specific causes at work – apart from the 
differences in the underlying technologies, insti-
tutions, etc. Several of these ‘other causes’ appear 
in a diffuse way throughout the literature, despite 
their importance for explaining a system’s perfor-
mance. In particular, we refer to the dynamics of 
the goals (or simply ‘goal dynamics’) and inten-
tionality of the agents interacting within a system. 
In this context, our claim is that agents’ inten-
tionality is a driver of the dynamics of Systems of 
Innovation (SI). This claim is based on a general 
approach in which economic processes unfold 
through intentional action, although the sys-
temic properties of the system emerge as a result 
of agent interaction. The importance of the role 
played by the goals agents pursue according to 
their beliefs, values and representations, etc. has 
been recognized (Nelson, 2006, p. 497); however, 
intentionality seems to be underplayed in the SI 
literature.
Intentionality – which implies planning of a 
subjective kind using imagination, beliefs, infor-
mation, etc. – is important for explaining the 
   
The connections that constitute agent 
 knowledge, whatever its content and structure 
are the basis of their economic and social action. 
Agents make use of their acquired knowledge to 
draw up theories (Nelson, 2008a) on how the 
diverse elements that constitute the physical-
natural, technological and social systems within 
which they deploy their action are causally con-
nected. These theories have a conjectural value 
(Popper, 1972) and they are not necessarily true 
in that they have not been scientifically con-
trasted. These theories are models or frameworks 
that enable agents to anticipate (or form expecta-
tions about) the consequences of their actions in a 
context of uncertainty, thus defining a set of fea-
sible events and weights (‘probability’) attached 
to them by agents. These future courses of action 
have to be necessarily imagined and deemed pos-
sible (Loasby, 1996) since they affect the agents’ 
actions. Models provide frameworks and proce-
dures which, insofar as they are of common use, 
may be defined as institutions (Loasby, 1999).
Learning consists in testing and (eventually) 
retaining new connections that prove to be use-
ful for agents to reach their goals; in this sense 
we may speak of driven learning processes. As a 
consequence, agents deploy bounded rationality 
which ‘connote the reasoning and learning abili-
ties of an agent who has a goal to achieve and, on 
the one hand, an at least partially formed theory 
about how to achieve it (this is the ‘rationality’ 
part of the concept), and on the other hand, that 
the agent’s theory is likely somewhat crude and 
perhaps even a bad guide for action, and that suc-
cess is far from assured (this is the meaning of the 
‘bounded’ qualification to rationality)’ (Nelson, 
2008a, p. 78). Both aspects of the concept seem 
necessary to capture what we know about human 
and organizational problem-solving in a variety 
of different arenas. This approach is also compat-
ible with the emergence of novelty and with the 
growth of knowledge; i.e., with the conditions of 
possibility of true learning processes (Witt, 2009).
Action plAns, knowledge And Agents’ goAls
Evolutionary systems are systems liable to 
 continuous change: Evolution is the result of the 
self-transformation of systems over time (Witt, 
a theoretical foundation of a system that focuses on 
the concept of connections and what makes them 
the prime variables. Action Plans, Knowledge and 
Agents’ Goals section poses the microfoundation 
of dynamism of SI, especially how connections 
are established among elements within a system 
and how agents’ capabilities evolve. Capabilities, 
Intentionality and SI Performance section 
explores the implications of agents’ capabilities 
and intentionality for the resulting performance 
of an SI. In this section, an evolutionary efficiency 
criterion for the dynamic performance of a com-
plex process is proposed. Concluding Remarks 
section offers some concluding remarks.
systems, knowledge And connections
Analytically, a system is explained by both its con-
stituent elements and the connections by which 
they are related in order to accomplish a com-
mon purpose, innovation in the case of SIs. In 
a dynamic analysis, the fundamental issues are 
that connections are continually changing, which 
‘makes connections the prime variables’ (Potts, 
2000, p. 5), and that the recombinant process 
of connections may generate novelties (Loasby, 
2001). Knowledge itself is an example of associa-
tion among elements: What the specific elements 
are and how they are connected is knowledge 
itself – it may be considered a structure; a system 
of connections that is also changing.
Knowledge is a system; hence the structures 
of the human brain by which it is supported also 
constitute a system (see also Dopfer, 2005, p. 24; 
Fuster, 2003). At the same time, they are parts of 
a human body, etc. From another point of view, 
knowledge is embodied in organizations and 
firms, sectors, etc. that are higher-level systems. 
The growth of knowledge consists of building 
connections between the internal elements of a 
system, and in turn between these elements and 
others belonging to higher or lower ranks. The 
economic agent itself is a system. Following Earl 
(2003), the economic agent is completely recon-
structed when all of its internal and external oper-
ational connections have been made completely 
explicit. Moreover, economic agents are continu-
ously establishing (and removing) connections. 
We refer to such a process as learning.
        
‘invent’ the future on which they focus their actions. 
This idea is valid whether we consider objectives 
in the short, mid or long term. The opportunities 
for acting in a specific way (entrepreneurial action, 
for instance) are not hidden somewhere in real-
ity, waiting to be discovered by entrepreneurs or 
visionaries, but they ‘emerge’ initially in the mind 
of agents regardless of the fact that at some time 
in the future they may be embodied in a written 
document or an organizational form, etc.
Evolutionary economics usually describes the 
evolution of an economy as a consequence of 
the growth of knowledge. However, the locus of 
the goals agents pursue (as well as their internal 
dynamics of evolution, which alter their hierar-
chical interdependence and contents) and their 
intentionality as elements that encourage action 
and knowledge, although recognized in modern 
neuroscience (Fuster, 2008) is beyond the scope 
of economics; or at least remains problematic. 
Nevertheless, the goals and intentionality of agents 
play an essential role in explaining the emergence 
of novelties and evolving capabilities (Cañibano, 
Encinar, & Muñoz, 2006; Langlois, 2006), insti-
tutions (Nelson, 2008b, p. 7) and learning pro-
cesses (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000, pp. 2–4).
In general, evolutionary economics proceeds 
in its models and theories as if the goals pursued 
by agents were given. Action plans should articu-
late the best way to match (given a set of resources 
and/or of possible actions) those goals. Until 
recently the analysis of the role played by agents’ 
intentionality and the goals they pursued in the 
development of new capabilities, new patterns of 
behavior, etc. had been postponed.2 However, a 
true dynamic theory should consider the real fact 
that new goals of action may emerge, that the 
hierarchical ordering of goals may change, and 
that goals reached now (or never) may be removed 
from or replaced in agents’ plans, etc. All these 
2003b, pp. 12–13). Evolution is seen as the pro-
cess or set of processes that combine the generation 
of novelties with the selective retention of some 
of these novelties (Dopfer & Potts, 2008; Loasby, 
2001), following the well-known evolution-
ary three-phase schema:  Generation-selection/
adoption-retention of variety (Foster & Metcalfe, 
2001). Moreover, evolving systems are character-
ized by continuous endogenous change induced 
by the generation of novelties and subject to selec-
tion processes that operate on self-organized pro-
cesses (Kauffman, 1995).
In order to understand the microfoundation of 
an SI, we should carefully differentiate between 
the types of connections that are established 
between the elements in a system. In particular, 
between the different kinds of elements that are 
connected: Means/actions and goals/objectives, 
which determine the direction of connections.
Economic dynamics are sustained by agents’ 
activities. And to the extent that these activities 
are rational, they are planned activities – not cer-
tainly in the sense that they obey a central plan, 
but in the sense that they are planned by agents 
themselves. Thus economic dynamics may be 
understood in a complementary way to that previ-
ously exposed as the process of generation, adop-
tion and an attempted interactive deployment 
of the agents’ action plans (Encinar & Muñoz, 
2006; Muñoz & Encinar, 2014; Muñoz, Encinar, 
& Canibano, 2011). Agents’ action plans are the 
result of a key operation that consists of agents 
allocating means/actions projectively in order to 
reach the goals/ends/objectives they pursue. In 
other words, at any moment in time, an action 
plan may be interpreted as a template or ‘guide’ 
for action that projectively connects elements of 
a different nature: Something the agent wants to 
achieve (goals) with the actions and means the 
agent ‘knows’ afford him/her success.
Agents choose their goals of action on the basis 
of a myriad of psychological, social, and cultural 
factors, motives (Barnard, 1938), beliefs (Metcalfe, 
2004), etc. Agents’ action plans are constituted 
using their imagination (Loasby, 2007), taking into 
account that the goals they pursue are located in an 
imagined future (Lachmann, 1994/1978). Thus, 
it could be said without exaggeration that agents 
2 Even so, intentionality in learning processes is a key, but 
relatively unexplored, dimension of capability building 
in strategic tasks. However, the role of purposes is not 
strange to the literature of technical innovation. For 
example, Arthur (2007, p. 276) defines technology in 
terms of human purposes. North (2005) also devotes 
chapter 4 to these issues.
   
to analyze how agents’ cognitive dynamics might, 
for example, imply the introduction of new (pro-
jected) actions or means in agents’ plans and the 
discovery (invention) of new relationships between 
actions and goals as a consequence of novelties in 
the agents’ projective space of goals; thus implying a 
change in the connections between elements within 
a system. Consequently, although not all actions are 
intended, nor are all novelties a consequence or the 
pursuit of particular goals, the evolution of agents’ 
goals and intentions is a key explanatory factor since 
it triggers processes that establish and renew the 
connections within a system (Muñoz et al., 2011).
cApAbilities, intentionAlity And si 
performAnce
The diversity and intensity of changes in agents’ 
intentionality have substantial value as impor-
tant factors for explaining socio-economic self- 
transformation processes. They trigger search 
processes and the establishment of connections 
with adjacent states of the system, thus altering 
its topology and giving rise to new features that 
emerge within the system. Moreover, together 
with the means that agents discover and ‘invent’ 
to reach them, these changing goals and inten-
tions constitute the agents’ action plans that they 
(attempt to) deploy interactively. The deployment 
of driven learning processes is also capable of mod-
ulating institutions, configuring agent networks, 
changing standards, beliefs and agents’ habits, etc., 
as well as giving rise to new evolving capabilities.
Capabilities and intentionality
Our argument enables the identification of the 
analytical locus of agents’ goals and intentional-
ity as explanatory factors of the transformation 
of agents’ spaces of action and, therefore, of the 
systems they configure. The constitution of evolv-
ing capabilities by agents within an SI enables a 
‘two-layered’ analysis: on the one hand, the analy-
sis of the constitutive elements of a system (ele-
ments and connections; that is, its structure); and 
on the other, the analysis of how the connections 
between those elements (its dynamics) evolve. 
The evolution of such connections is by necessity 
associated with the diversity and changes in the 
goals pursued by the agents that configure the SI.
changes involve learning processes, as well as the 
emergence of completely new actions that can-
not be explained solely by means of knowledge 
acquisition. They are special connections that are 
established between new goals and means/actions.
In our approach, intentionality, which can 
be defined technically as ‘that feature of repre-
sentations by which they are about something or 
directed at something’ (Searle, 1995, p. 7f. Italics 
in the original), is linked to goals, and it activates 
the development of capabilities, the testing of new 
connections within a system, and, therefore, the 
generation of new knowledge. Aligning, coordinat-
ing, reordering and even inventing new goals are 
activities that generate novelty and are therefore 
sources of true dynamism in economic processes.3
Of course, not all changes in society are the 
result of intended actions. In fact, not all actions 
carried out by agents are intended. Furthermore, 
not all the consequences of actions are intended or 
even expected. The consequences of actions may 
be, and usually are, very different from what agents 
pursue. Interaction in complex situations, un-
knowledge, etc. may lead to completely unexpected 
results. Moreover, it has been said that evolution 
is a ‘blind’ process (Vanberg, 2006) because new 
properties and unintended consequences emerge 
within it. Nevertheless, human action, qua ratio-
nal, within human constraints, is intended action: 
There must be goals (reasons) in order to act.4 
From the perspective of action plans, it is possible 
3 Intentionality exists not only in private mental space, but 
also in functional space with others (Malle, Moses, & 
Baldwin, 2001).
4 ‘[I]n the discourse on prefrontal physiology, goal is of the 
essence. All cognitive functions of the lateral prefrontal 
cortex are determined, we might say ‘caused’, by goals. 
If there is a unique and characteristic feature of that part 
of the brain, it is its ability to structure the present in 
order to serve the future, by this apparently inverting the 
temporal direction of causality. Of course this inversion 
is not real in physical terms. It is only real in cognitive, 
thus neural, terms inasmuch as the representations of the 
goals for future actions antecede and cause those actions 
to occur through the agency of the prefrontal cortex. 
Teleology thus understood is at the basis of planning and 
decision-making, which are two of the major executive 
functions of the prefrontal cortex.’ (Fuster, 2008, p. 4.)
        
structures and contents. These new structures 
of connections between new means/actions and 
goals introduce a ‘renewed genetic material’ in 
the form of new action plans (new conjectures) 
which, when interacting, transforms the system 
connections network, giving rise to the emer-
gence of novelties within the system and fueling 
evolutionary processes. The appearance or hierar-
chical rearrangement of goals constitutes a source 
of transformation of the agents’ plans and of the 
subsystems that make up the economic system.
In the example of Life Sciences, much current 
research is based on skills, routines and capabili-
ties already implemented by scientists and whose 
origin is linked to past goals they deliberately tried 
to reach. Why then does a system continue to 
develop new capabilities, as in the case of science, 
once certain given objectives have been reached? 
To answer this question, let us assume that the goal 
pursued by scientists within a specific field may 
be reached; in other words, it is technically attain-
able and the scientific community has been able 
to deploy the actions required (learning, adapting, 
developing capabilities, etc.) to attain its purpose. 
If the goal is reached, there would be no apparent 
reason for continuing the learning process, con-
cluding the capability implementation process. 
However, experience shows that learning processes 
never come to an end in a knowledge economy. As 
already mentioned, the reason lies in the continu-
ous appearance of renewed goals of action.
For instance, in Biomedicine it is not enough 
to discover a treatment for a serious illness: 
Scientists are also interested in its mechanisms 
of propagation, its genetic base, etc. (Consoli & 
Ramlogan, 2008). The conception of new goals 
activates behaviors and actions by means of inten-
tion and will, aimed at the pursuit of that goal. 
This process generates new knowledge by trans-
forming agents’ evolving capabilities.
The performance of an SI
Based on the endogenous dynamism proposed in 
this paper (the feedback process between agents’ 
intentionality and their evolving capabilities), the 
overall function of an SI may be examined from 
an abstract system perspective. We may examine 
how the different parts (elements) of the SI are 
The emergence of evolving capabilities allows us 
to weave the network and thus explain it. Let us 
assume, for instance, an SI within the so called Life 
Sciences. Learning processes and scientific knowl-
edge in Life Sciences allow for an understanding of 
the state and evolution of present research, imple-
mented on the basis of the capabilities and skills of 
scientists. However, these learning processes and 
this current knowledge also generate new research 
questions that spur the acquisition of new scientific 
knowledge. This new scientific knowledge, which 
can eventually give rise to new technological knowl-
edge (which might be developed in firms, universi-
ties, research councils, etc.), is the starting point for 
the emergence and development of new capabilities 
within the scientific community itself and  – if the 
conditions for accessibility and appropriateness so 
allow – the emergence of firms. The formation of 
new links between the system of science and firms 
would follow the implementation of new capabili-
ties of the SI as a whole. Thus, the development 
process of capabilities as intended (driven) learning 
processes would configure the connections between 
several elements that constitute the system.
This example helps to illustrate how and why 
it is possible that the connections within a sys-
tem are continuously being established. As afore-
mentioned, the emergence and development of 
capabilities are induced by intention, by agents’ 
tendency toward the goals they set. Goals are 
imagined realities, expectations, valued as more 
desirable states and toward which agents direct 
their action. Within a system, there is constant 
feedback between the intention and the evolu-
tionary capabilities and this feedback explains the 
transformation of the system itself.
The pursuit of a new goal may cause new capa-
bilities and new patterns of behavior to be developed 
and learning processes to be activated, giving rise to 
new actions and interactions and new ways of doing 
things (process innovations) that may ultimately 
yield (by means of design, or as a result of selection) 
new institutions and/or modify the existing ones. It 
also may give rise to entrepreneurial experimenta-
tion processes (Bergek et al., 2008, p. 415), political 
entrepreneurship (Witt, 2003a p. 82), etc.
In other words, pursuing new goals allows for 
the emergence of agents’ action plans with new 
   
The efficiency criterion we propose here is an 
evolutionary criterion because it is based on the 
continuous feedback process that goes from inten-
tion to actions and vice versa that is at the basis 
of the self-transformation (evolution) of agents’ 
action spaces. This self-transforming process of a 
system, of its elements and of its connections, is 
what makes it an evolving complex system. This 
intentional pursuit of goals by agents causes new 
capabilities and new patterns of behavior to be 
developed and learning processes to be activated, 
giving rise to new actions (and interactions) and 
new ways of doing things (process innovations) 
and so on, in a co-evolutionary process.7
The purpose of this criterion is not to fix an 
external register of the elements, products and 
functionalities (e.g., determined by an exter-
nal policy evaluator) so as to then measure and 
compare the performance of the system relative 
to the said external metric. Rather, the criterion 
proposed here and applied to an SI ‘measures’ 
through the development (performance) of the SI 
itself because it is relative to the goals, intentions 
and expectations of the agents involved in that 
particular SI.
In terms of this criterion the performance of 
an SI is high if the connections within that system 
are adequate insofar as they cause the achievement 
of the pursued goals; if this is the case, we say that 
the SI is evolutionary efficient. In contrast, low 
SI performance would be the result of inadequate 
connections that do not lead to the achievement 
of the pursued goals; this is the case of an inef-
ficient evolutionary system. Consider the next 
example. Let us take an action plan of an orga-
nization – the publication policy of a research 
institute of medical sciences, for example – whose 
main aim is to increase the prestige of that institu-
tion by means of reaching a prominent position 
in international medical publication rankings. Let 
G1 be that goal. If G1 were the main goal pursued, 
then the remaining means/actions and goals in the 
research institute’s action plan should lead to and 
connected (if they are indeed connected), the 
volume, intensity and character of the interac-
tions, their continuity and the progressive impli-
cation of more agents, which agents are more 
(less) dynamic, the goals they pursue and if they 
are compatible a priori, etc. In this approach, the 
process of dynamic sequences of connections 
between the means/actions and goals established 
by the agents that interact within an SI, which 
produces new action plans, may be judged in 
terms of the adequacy of connections.
Roughly speaking, we can say that connections 
between means/actions and goals are adequate if 
they allow the projected actions and the deploy-
ment of means to produce the pursued goals. In 
other words, connections between means/actions 
and goals are adequate when intentions (which 
activate and change as new goals are formulated) 
give rise to actual facts as expected. Thus, there is 
evolutionary efficiency within an economic system 
when agents’ intentionality is being ‘materialized’ 
through agents’ actions: Because of the efficiency 
of the connections between means/actions and 
goals, intentions turn out to be actual facts in 
which goals are produced.5 For example, within a 
given SI, scientists satisfy their aspirations of wis-
dom and (perhaps) social recognition; ‘capitalists’ 
or venture capital firms achieve a reasonable return, 
which is an incentive for investment; govern-
ments that fund (public) scientific research obtain 
a social (and perhaps political) return; users have 
better, safer and cheaper products and services at 
their disposal or a cleaner environment; enterprise 
and public organizations achieve their social goals, 
etc. In short, the fulfillment of the different agents’ 
goals and the compatibility (coordination) of their 
plans and expectations (von Hayek, 1937, p. 37), 
etc. strengthen the (new) connections within the 
system: This entire means that the characteristic 
pattern of  innovation of the system is efficient.6
5 Agents’ actions are both effective and efficient using 
Barnard’s (1938) terminology.
6 We should also consider the ‘institutional return’ of an SI: 
How the institutional environment emerges, adapts and 
transforms and how this affects the compatibility of the 
agents’ goals (‘coordination’) within an SI. See Hodgson 
(2004).
7 An example of the role of designing and implementing 
policy goals (and targeting) and its consequences in terms 
of infant industries development and cluster formation is 
Avnimelech and Teubal (2008).
        
some agents’ goals are unrealistic? In our example, 
the researchers pursuing entrepreneurial  activities 
(linked to G
2
) are intrinsically preventing the pos-
sibility of achieving their main goal G
1
 – high 
quality papers – which is a flagrant paradox. All 
this results in an internal inconsistency of action 
plans that produces a rationing of goal satisfaction 
and which, in turn, worsens the efficiency of the 
agents’ actions. Thus a system (individuals, orga-
nization, etc.) as a whole may produce a lower 
performance in terms of the pursued goals.8
How can inefficiency be lowered? There are 
different options for removing the source of 
action-rationing9 within such a system: agents 
may lower their expectations (reviewing and, 
eventually, removing some of their goals); adjust 
their actions/means to the rationing; review the 
content and/or hierarchy of the goals of their 
action plans; abandon some of their goals; change 
the institutional setting; and, perhaps introduce 
innovations. (In our example above by means of 
promoting sabbatical years, recruiting specialized 
personnel for fund raising activities, etc).
concluding remArks
No theoretical analysis should be made without a 
careful observation of reality: It is a fact that agents 
plan their actions. Otherwise, agents’ actions 
would be irrational or absolutely erratic (Nelson, 
2006). The analysis of the interactive deployment 
of agents’ actions and their products provides a 
useful framework for exploring the nature, prop-
erties, dynamics and complexity of connections 
within economic systems. Thus, the dynamic 
action of the agents that interact within a system 
should be explained under the categories of inten-
tionality (Searle, 2001). Otherwise it is almost 
impossible to explain the products (commodi-
ties, technologies, structures, systems, etc.) and 
categories (value, prices, causality, etc.) of action 
unless as self-referenced explanations which are 
not explanations by means of micro-foundations.
be consequent with this goal. The  organization’s 
action plan is efficient/inefficient a priori depend-
ing on the ordering of the means/actions required 
to achieve this goal. At the same time, this depends 
on the absence/presence of logical contradictions 
or impossibilities among the actions/means to 
goals and on the absence/presence of conflicting 
goals. If this ordering means that the organization 
is capable of triggering the actions/means needed 
to reach a sufficient aspirational level of satisfac-
tion regarding its main goal, we could say that the 
connections between the means/actions to goals 
and other goals are efficient (from the point of 
view of the acting agent).
Now let us suppose that the research institute 
proposes a second goal, which may also operate as 
a means to increase its prestige: To strengthen its 
financial position. By doing so the institute pro-
vides its researchers with monetary incentives to 
carry out entrepreneurial activities such as fund 
raising. Let G2 be that new goal. This policy tries 
to give the researchers the possibility of reaching a 
certain extra level of income and tries to increase 
the quality of their scientific production. The 
(new) actions that are carried out may lead to the 
new proposed goal G
2
 being achieved. If so, then 
we could say that the actions would be efficient or 
that certain elements linked to G
2
 would appear 
and prevent the fulfillment of the plan in which 
high quality research papers are the primary goal. 
What if the researchers were to maintain a strict 
preference for their primary goal G
1
 over the new 
goal G
2
; would they, at the same time, allocate a 
growing number of hours to G
2
 related activities, 
such that they may not have enough time to pro-
duce high quality research papers? When research-
ers devote a growing number of hours each day to 
complementary activities (such as meetings with 
venture capital firms, doing business plans, etc.) 
and, at the same time, maintain the hierarchy of 
the main goal G
1
 over the new goal G
2
, then they 
are formulating internally inconsistent plans – 
and thus giving rise to inefficient action.
Does this mean that all agents have to achieve 
their goals if the SI is to perform well? What if the 
SI supports the fulfillment of the goals of some 
agents, but not of others’? What if one agent’s goal 
is to block the development of the SI? What if 
8 Geels (2004) has explored the origin and consequences of 
these kinds of tensions and mismatches in goals, interests, 
etc. in a more specific context.
9 An example is the Keynesian theory of effective demand 
(see Benassy, 1986).
  
in general, and on SI in particular, with an eco-
nomic theory of action, but perhaps it should 
also include cognitive science, management and 
strategic literature, among others. Otherwise, 
the risk of the literature on SI being considered a 
non-organic part of a broader theoretical corpus 
is likely to remain.
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